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Pirelli Tyre Holding’s assets. The rest of the purchase prize would have to be
financed by taking on new loans of DM 0.4 - 1.25 bn. Pirelli itself would
then use part of the consideration to buy sufficient  newly issued Continental
stock to acquire control of the German tiremaker4. lt was contended by
Pirelli in its proposal that its Plans were supported by a group of Italian and
German investors who allegedly held more than 50 % of Continental’s
stock. Pirelli did not, however, reveal who these investors were. It pointed
out that this group planned to tender the new shares stemming from the
capital increase in Continental to Pirelli Tyre Holding N.V. lt would thus
resch a majority within this group. Accordingly, the supervisory board5 of
Continental would have, according to Pirelli’s proposal, to represent the new
shareholding structure in the future, and the management of Continental
was expected to follow the strategic orientation of the Pirelli group.
Pirelli explained its Suggestion as an effort to catch up with the other three
leading competitors on the world tire market by combining the market shares
of Pirelli and Conti up to 16 % as well by uniting their R&D activities,
manufacturing technologies  and customer Services. From these synergies it
expected an improvement of consolidated operating results before taxes of
more than $ 250 million over a four-year time frame after the merger. All
this would then, according to Pirelli’s proposal, provide the necessary basis
for improved returns to all shareholders of both groups and benefits to their
employees.
As a consequence of Pirelli’s proposal, Continental’s share price dropped.
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Development of stock prices before and after Pirelli’s merger proposal4
IV. Legal Considerations
How could Pirelli’s Plans be implemented? To Start with, German Company
law (5 § 339 ff. Aktiengesetz - Stock Corporation Act) does not allow a true
Cross-border merger with a Dutch N.V. (Pirelli Tyre Holding N.V.) which
would result in the dissolution of the Dutch N.V. and the transfer of all
assets to the “incorporating” German stock corporation (Continental AG) in
exchange for a participation  of the shareholders of the dissolved Dutch N.V.
in Continental AG6. Hence there were mainly only two ways left.
Continental AG could raise its share capital (nominal capital - “Grundkapital”)
of about DM 435 mill. by issuance of new shares and hand out these new
shares to Pirelli SpA or its Dutch subsidiary in exchange for its Pirelli Tyre
holding business. The assets of this Dutch subsidiary would then be
transferred to Continental as a “contribution in kind” (Sacheinlage; cf. § 183
AktG - Stock Corporation Act). This would, however, require that the
preemptive rights of the other (Old) shareholders of Continental be
eliminated7. There are two hurdles on this way: First, the exclusion of the
preemptive rights tan only be effected by conclusion of the shareholders in
a shareholders’ meeting who hold shares equivalent to at least three
quarters of the firm’s capital represented in the meeting (§ 186 [3]
Aktiengesetz); the Statutes of the corporation must not provide for a lower
majority. Second, the courts will, upon request of a shareholder whose
preemptive right was excluded, investigate whether such exclusion was
reasonable and necessary to resch the aim of acquiring Pirelli’s tyre
business8.
Because of these difficulties, Pirelli proposed to choose another way9. Conti
was asked to raise its capital without excluding its shareholders’ preemptive
rights. This tan be effected in principle - if the Statutes of a Company
provide for that which Continental’s Statutes did - by a conclusion in the
shareholder’s meeting with the simple majority of the votes cast. Continental
then would use the cash paid in by its shareholders to buy Pirelli’s Dutch
tyre business. In Order to get control over Conti, Pirelli would then have to
buy a controlling block of these newly issued shares from the group of
shareholders which allegedly agreed with Pirelli’s Plans.5
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This plan, however, touched upon two other critical issues of which only
one was mentioned by Pirelli in its proposal. The arrangement which Pirelli
proposed could be considered to be a circumvention of the rules of the
Stock Corporation Act concerning contributions in kind (Sacheinlagen).
According to this circumvention doctrine it does not matter whether a
shareholder, instead of contributing assets as in a true case of a contribution
in kind, promises to contribute in cash when subscribing for new shares,
and then sells assets to the Company and gets his cash contribution back as
his purchase prize. In both cases the subscriber will be submitted to the
rules governing contributions in kind and, as he did not comply with these
rules in the second case, he will have to pay the cash contribution once
again. The same circumvention doctrine would apply also to a Seller of
assets if a third Party subscribed for new shares provided that this person
acted upon the request and at the risk of the sellerlO. If the group of friends
of Pirelli (the Pirelli “support group”) who allegedly already held the majority
of shares of Conti acted upon request and at the risk of Pirelli the whole
transaction could hence be considered to be in fact a contribution in kind
and be submitted to the rules applicable thereon.
The second hurdle for Pirelli’s Plans emerged from the cap on the voting
rights on Conti’s shares in the Statutes of this target Company. Continental
AG belongs to the group of (in 1990: 22) publicly held stock corporations
which have adopted provisions in their Statutes to the effect that no one
shareholder may vote more than (in Conti’s case) 5 % of all shares of the
Company’ 1. This rule would mean a clear obstacle to Pirelli’s Plans to gain
and exercize control over Conti and its management in the future. Pirelli and
his friends could not Change this statutory Provision on their own even if
they held the majority of shares in a shareholders’ meeting as, according to
a resolution adopted at Conti’s 1989 shareholders’ meeting, to waive or
amend articles of the Statutes of Continental required a 75 % majority12.
Hence Pirelli asked in its letter that this statutory cap on the voting rights  be
Continental’s Governance Structure
eliminated first.
V.
Only a few days after Pirelli’s letter, Continental’s management as well as its
supervisory board decided to reject the proposal and said an alternative
proposal would be presented to Pirellil 3.7
At this Point, some remarks about the governance structure of Continental
seem appropriate. Being a stock corporation (“Aktiengesellschaft”),
Continental has a management board (“Vorstand”) and a separate
supervisory board (“Aufsichtsrat”). Interlocks between these two Organs are
forbidden. Management ist appointed, mostly for five years, and dismissed
by the supervisory board. In 1990, the management board of Continental
AG consisted of 8 members and was chaired by Mr. Horst Urban. The
management board of an Aktiengesellschaft runs the firm independently in
its day-to-day business and tan be recalled only for Cause. lt has to report to
the supervisory board periodically and to ask for its consent to certain major
transactions (like, e. g., the acquisition of the assets of the Dutch subsidiary
of Pirelli).
As Continental AG employs more than 2,000 employees, it is subject to the
rules of the Codetermination Act of 1976 (Mitbestimmungsgesetz). That
means that half of the members of its supervisory board are appointed by
the shareholders and the other half by the employees (blue and white collar
as well as lower-ranking management) and by labour Unions. Thus the
codetermination  rules prove - unintentionally but warmly welcomed by
managements - to be another structural impediment to hostile takeovers as
an acquiror would have to deal with the workforce’s and the Unions’
representatives on the supervisory board. - In 1990, the supervisory board
of Continental consisted of 20 members, half of them elected by the
shareholders, the other half of them being representatives of the workforce.
Its chair was held by Dr. Ulrich Weiß, at the same time member of the
management board of Deutsche Bank AG 14. Later on, after the failure of the
merger talks, Pirelli maintained that there had been several meetings
between the chairmen of the board of Pirelli and the supervisory board of
Conti before its official proposal, and that the latter had given his agreement
and support to Pirelli’s Plans 15. Pirelli claimed further that Deutsche Bank
had advised it initially in its merger Plans whereas it acted afterwards,
through its subsidiary Morgan Grenfell, as an advisor to Conti’s management
in the takeover battlel6. Only incidentally I note that also Gerhard Schröder,
Prime Minister of the (Federal State of) Lower Saxony, Social Democratic
Party, had talks with Leopold0 Pirelli after Pirelli’s offer and declared that he
fully supported a combination of both groups17.  I will get back to8
Schröder’s role and his understanding of an active “Industriepolitik” later
(XI., below).
VI. The Failure of the Merger Talks
In his answer to Pirelli the speaker of the management board Mr. Urban
claimed that the purchase prize asked by Pirelli was far above market levels.
Pirelli’s business was worth only 800 million. However, Continental offered
to hold merger negotiations, provided that talks were held in private, all
information kept confidential, and that Pirelli as well as its “support group”
agreed to a stand still agreement‘8. Pirelli and through it the members of its
“support group” were asked to - within the next three years - abstain from
any trading of Continental’s stock, trying to Change Continental’s charter in
Order to eliminate the 5 % voting cap, or supporting the law suit of one of
Conti’s shareholders concerning the 1989 charter amendment resolution19.
As Pirelli refused to sign this agreement, Continental said it considered the
offer as hostile and would resist a forced merger*O. Hence the question
whether an agreement between the management board which acts on behalf
of the corporation  and
in future is void or
unresolved.
Finally, in a letter to t
its
is
he
shareholder(s) on how the shares are to be voted
legally binding under German law, remained
shareholders as of Jan. 21, 1991, Continental’s
executive and supervisory boards declared that they had decided to end
merger talks with Pirelli*l.
The main reasons which were put forward in that letter** were:
The price range of DM 1.85 - 2.25 bn for Pirelli’s tyre assets was
wholly excessive. The market capitalisation of Pirelli Tyre in
December 1990 was DM 0.73 bn. Pirelli had claimed that Pirelli Tyre
was significantly undervalued by the stock market and should
represent as much as 45 % of the valuation of the combined group.
On the basis of Continental’s market capitalisation  as of Dec. 1990
of DM 1.8 bn, this would have valued Pirelli Tyre at up to DM 1.47
bn. This was, according to Conti and its advisors who had
undertaken a valuation of Pirelli Tyre on the basis of public9
information, an unjustified premium of 100 % to its current market
capitalisation.
This premium were to be paid by Continental despite the fact that
those of its shareholders not associated with Pirelli would have
ceded control of the business to Pirelli and therefore they, and not
Pirelli, should be the recipients of a control premium.
Continental would have to take on substantial loans to finance the
purchase at a time when conditions in the tyre industry were
deteriorating substantially*S.
Although a merged group would have substantial
Europe, a merger would give rise to only limited
additional sales as the brands of the two
market shares in
opportunities for
firms were not
interchangeable, and would in all probability lead to a loss of
business from Conti’s principal customers, the German automobile
manufacturers, who did not wish to be over exposed to only one
supplier.
Synergies which could result from a merger would be very limited,
and management resources should not be diverted to cope with such
a highly complex integration task which a merger
firms would involve.
Pirelli Tyre’s recent losses and
group’s ability to pay dividends
indebtedness would
and obtain finance.
of the two tyre
impair a merged
Continental’s employees’ representatives on the supervisory board
were extremely concerned about the implications of a merger with
Pirelli Tyre since they feared that it would materially weaken
Continental and perhaps even result in lay-offs of employees.
Pirelli was not prepared to disclose the names of its associates or the
arrangements between them.
This “support group” and the arrangements between its members are worth
to be looked at more closely.10
VII. Pirelli’s Support Group: Facts and Legal Issues
In its initial proposal Pirelli had indicated that a group of German and Italian
industrial and institutional investors who held shares in excess of 50  % of
Conti’s share capital had favourably valued Pirelli’s merger Plans, but had
not revealed who these investors were. Pirelli had to build such an allicance
of different shareholders because of the 5 % voting cap in Continental’s
Statutes.
1. The facts
Pirelli itself had started to purchase shares on its own up to 5 % of Conti’s
stock and to build its “support group” by mid of 199024. In Order to gain
the (simple) majority of all votes cast in a shareholders meeting a sufficient
number of different shareholders (the exact number depending on the actual
presence of shareholders in a shareholders’ meeting25) had to gather. In
October 1990 Mediobanca, a leading Italian merchant bank, and Sopaf
(Societa Partecipazioni) SpA, Milan, revealed that each of them bought 5 %
interest in Continental. Italmobiliare said it indirectly held 3 %28 FIAT of
Italy which first had confirmed to hold less than 4 % sold this Stake off
later, before the special shareholder’s meeting in March 199127. lt remained
unclear who the other members of the support group were.
According to a ruling of the district tourt (Landgericht) of Hannover Pirelli
had, in March 1991, in addition to its own Stake of 5 %, a “po01 agreement”
with at least a further 20.4 % of Conti’s stock and Options for another
9 %28. According to this pool agreement Pirelli was obliged to compensate
the respective investors for all losses and costs incurred, especially declines
in the price of Conti’s stock, whereas prize gains should stay with the
investors. The summary of the facts mentions that Pirelli’s support group
had bought its shares (mill. 1,789,322)  at a prize of DM 310, and that this
prize had dropped by March 1991 to DM 214. - The Partners of the
indemnity agreement were obliged to bring all their influence to bear on
Continental in Order to achieve its merger with Pirelli as soon as possible. In
particular they had promised to vote for the increase of Conti’s capital stock
in Order to finance the purchase of Pirelli Tyre, for the repeal of the 5 %
voting cap, and for the representation of Pirelli on the supervisory board.11
Furthermore, they were obliged to transfer all newly issued shares to Pirelli
in Order to get Pirelli full control over Conti. Pirelli was entitled to give the
other investors instructions how to vote on other matters. Lastly, the
investors were prohibited from selling their shares to third Parties and were
obliged to transfer them to Pirelli at its request.
2. Legal lssues
The formation of the “support group” by Pirelli raises several legal issues.
al The “Transparency Directive” of the EC29 has not yet been
transformed into German law. According to this directive each acquiror of
stock of a Company will have to give due notice within 7 days to that
Company if his or her amount of shares equals, surmounts or falls below
certain thresholds (10 %, 20 %, 1/3, 50 % and 2/3, respectively). Shares
which are held by a third Party on the account of the acquiror have to be
added to his own holdings. The German Stock Corporation Act
(Aktiengesetz) only states a duty of a shareholder, if this shareholder is an
enterprise and his participation surmounts one fourth of the corporation’s
capital, to give it due notice thereof (§ 20 Aktiengesetz). Shares which are
held by a third Party on the account of the shareholder have to be added. As
long as this notice has not been given to the corporation, the respective
shareholder must not vote his or her shares. As Pirelli had only told Conti
that it was supported by a group of investors who all together held the
majority of Conti’s shares, but had not revealed the pool agreement, it had
failed to give due notice to Conti that it commanded in fact more than one
fourth of Conti’s shares. Hence the district tourt of Hannover ruled later that
Pirelli and his support group should not have voted their shares at the
extraordinary shareholders’ meeting which took place in March 1991, and
that the resolutions that were passed during this meeting were void30.
bl The draft of a Thirteenth Directive of the EC on takeovers (of Febr.
16, 1989) states a duty of any shareholder or investor who is about to
acquire one third (the member states may lower this threshold) or more of
the shares in a public Company to make a public offer to all shareholders to12
take over their shares as weil (Art. 4). Shares which are held by a third Party
on the account of the respective shareholder or investor have to be added.
Pirelli would have been obliged to make such an offer to the outside
shareholders of Conti if a comparable rule existed in German corporate law
which is, however, not the case. German corporate law neither knows of a
conclusion of the shareholders in a shareholders’ meeting on whether
control may be sold to a shareholder or investor who seeks to get control
nor does German corporate law know of a right of the outside shareholders
to tender their shares to him. It rather tries to protect the outside
shareholders ex Post, after the Company got under control of an other
enterprise, by the provisions of its law of “group of companies” (“Konzern-
recht”) which, however, leaves quite some Problems unresolved31.
C) One of the attempts of German corporations to protect themselves
against unwanted shifts of control are voting taps or maximum voting rights
(“Höchststimmrechte”). They are, however, a comparably inflexible and
doubtful instrument as they do not serve to protect the outside shareholders
in the Situation of a (hostile) takeover in the first line but rather inhibit a
Change of control at all and thus protect incumbent management32.
Furthermore, they tan be circumvented. The Stock Corporation Act provides
that a statutory voting cap of, say, 5 % restricts also those shares which
are held by a third Party for the account of a shareholder (§ 134 (1) (3)
Aktiengesetz). However, it is difficult to find out whether shares are held for
the account of another shareholder. If Pirelli SpA had not disclosed itself
that it was backed by a group of investors who were willing to support its
efforts to gain control, but had simply voted in a “concerted action” with
them to repeal the voting cap on Conti’s shares in the shareholders’
meeting, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to discover its
contravention of Conti’s statute which happened in a shareholder’s meeting
in March 1991 when Pirelli together with all other members of its support
group cast their votes. We turn to this shareholders’ meeting now.
VIII. The Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting and the Conti Support Group
On Dec. 12th, 1990, Continental received a request from Mr. Alberto Vicari,
Wiesbaden, representing a 5 % shareholding in Continental, that a meeting13
of Continental shareholders should be convened in Order to remove the
many uncertainties about the fate of Continental AG and the “state of
suspense” (Schwebezustand) complained about even by Conti’s
management.
7. Vicari’s proposals
According to Mr. Vicari, the shareholders’ meeting should determine
whether Conti should proceed with a merger with Pirelli Tyre Holding N.V. or
alternatively take Steps to strengthen Continental’s independence. The
pending structural questions and investment decisions of fundamental
importante represented such a significant  interference with the rights and
interests of the shareholders of Continental AG, that the Vorstand
(management board) could not make such far-reaching decisions exclusively
based on its own responsibility. Therefore, the Shareholders’ Meeting, as the
supreme body, had to consider these matters33.
In Order to resch this goal Mr. Vicari put forth five proposals on which the
shareholders’ meeting was asked to vote.
1. Amendment of the articles of incorporation:  A waiver or
amendment of the voting rights limitation of 5 % shall require a
majority of at least 3/4 of the votes cast and of the stated capital
represented at the meeting (In their Statement on Mr. Vicari’s
proposals Vorstand and Aufsichtsrat recommended shareholders to
vote for this resolution).
2. Amendment of the articles of incorporation:  The voting rights
limitation of 5 % in the articles of incorporation  shall be eliminated
(Vorstand and Aufsichtsrat recommended to vote aaainst this
proposal).
3. Amendment of the articles of incorporation:  The removal of
members of the Aufsichtsrat (supervisory board) who have been
elected by the shareholders’ meeting shall require a shareholders’
resolution adopted by a majority of at least 3/4 of the votes cast and
of the stated capital represented at the meeting instead of the actual14
simple majority requirement (Vorstand
recommended to vote aoainst this proposal).
and Aufsichtsrat
4. The Vorstand shall take all necessary Steps to allow the next
ordinary shareholders’ meeting to adopt a resolution that Continental
AG shall acquire the tyre business of Pirelli Tyre Holding N.V. by
way of an increase of the Company’s stated capital through a
contribution in kind, with the exclusion of the pre-emptive rights of
the shareholders (Vorstand and Aufsichtsrat recommended to vote
aaainst this proposal).
5. Amendment of the articles of incorporation:  The sale of any
division of the Company which accounts for more than 25 % of the
gross sales of the Company shall require a resolution adopted by the
shareholders’ meeting by a majority of at least 3/4 of the votes cast
and of the stated capital represented at the meeting (Vorstand and
Aufsichtsrat recommended to vote aaainst this proposal).
As Mr. Vicari held 5 % of Continental’s stock, management was obliged to
call the shareholder’s meeting as requested pursuant to 5 122 Stock
Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz).
The critical question for Continental’s incumbent management was whether
Pirelli and its support group would have enough votes and companions to
push the resolutions that were in favor of Pirelli’s Plans through (abolition of
the voting limitation - proposal 2, supra; acquisition of Pirelli’s tyre business
- proposal 4, supra), or whether Pirelli would at least be able to thwart
proposal 1 which was aimed at making it more difficult to remove the voting
limitation34. Generally a simple majority of the votes and capital represented
at the general meeting suffices for resolutions on issues like Vicari’s
proposals 1 and 2 whereas proposal 4 - preparation of an acquisition of
Pirelli’s tyre business by way of an increase of the Company’s capital with
the exclusion of the pre-emptive rights of the shareholders - required a 75 %
majority of the capital represented and a simple majority of the votes
represented at the general meeting (§ § 186 (3), 83 (1) Aktiengesetz). As
Continental’s management at the time at which Vicari asked it to call the
general meeting neither knew how large Pirelli’s support group actually was
nor was aware that there were binding agreements between the members of15
this group which shriveled the votes of the whole group up to 5 %35, it
tried to put a “Continental management support group” together in its turn.
2. The “Continental Management Support Group ”
In February 1991 the financial press reported that the investment bank
Morgan Grenfell, a subsidiary of Deutsche Bank AG and advisor to
management of Continental in its antitakeover struggle, had succeeded in
forming a group of shareholders of large German firms who had decided to
ward off Pirelli’s Plans. The group was said to hold a “blocking majority” of
at least 25 % of Continental’s capital plus 1 share. Members of this
management support group were reported to be: Allianz AG (Germany’s
largest insurer) with a Stake of 5 %; Deutsche Bank with 5 %; the German
car industry (BMW, Volkswagen and Daimler-Benz) with a total of about
7 %, Dresdner Bank with 3 %, and other major financial institutions like
Norddeutsche Landesbank, Bayerische Vereinsbank and others with about
5 %36. This group was at least able to block all conclusions which
requested a 3/4 majority of the capital represented in the shareholders’
meeting as, for instance, in the forthcoming extraordinary shareholders’
meeting set for March 13, the proposal to require the executive board
(Vorstand) to take the Steps necessary for a merger (proposal No. 4, supra).
When Pirelli became aware of that, it announced, one day before the
shareholders’ meeting, that it planned to abstain from the merger vote
(proposal 4, supra)37. FIAT which apparantly did not like to clash with the
German car manufacturers declared by March 11, 4 days before the special
shareholders meeting, that it had sold off all of its Stake in Continental36.
3. The Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting
The extraordinary general meeting was held on March 13, 1991. The actual
result of it was that all of the resolutions except proposal no. 2 (elimination
of the 5 % voting limitation) were voted down. That means that, on the one
hand, the 5 % voting limit was removed, but that, on the other hand, a
mandate to the management to seriously consider the merger was not
issued. The votes for the resolution concerning the voting limit constituted a
65.97 % majority of the shares represented at the meeting and remained16
just under 50 % of the actual shares outstanding39. As Pirelli’s support
group had voted in favor of this proposal no. 2, this revealed that Pirelli’s
Claim of majority control of Continental was overstated. By looking at the
abstentions on the merger resolution (proposal no. 4, supra), the shares
under Pirelli’s control was estimated to be 36.4 % of the capital stock40.
Later, an action was brought by two shareholders of Conti on the grounds
that Pirelli and its support group had acted illegally by voting shares without
having given due notice to Continental pursuant to § 20 Stock Corporation
Act, and by circumventing the statutory voting limitation of 5 %41.
Accordingly, the district tourt (Landgericht) of Hannover ruled on May 29,
1992 that the repeal of the voting limit by conclusion of the extraordinary
shareholders’s meeting was void42.
IX. The Resignations of the CEOs
After the special  shareholders’ meeting at Hannover the merger attempt
at a standstill. The 5 % voting cap was lifted, but the validity of
was
this
conclusion was contested in tourt. On the other hand, the shareholders had
not given the executive board a mandate to prepare an increase of Conti’s
capital stock in Order to achieve a merger with Pirelli. German as well as
Italian shareholders had taken considerable stakes in Conti, and Pirelli was
threatened by the Obligation to take over huge losses because of the
dropping prizes of Conti’s shares held by Pirelli’s support group. Both sides
had to consider new talks between the companies. The confrontational
approach of both sides had to be moderated first, and the proponents of this
strategy on both sides to be exchanged.  First the chairman of the executive
board of Conti, who had been heavily critised in the media for his attempt to
entrench management and for his total Opposition to a merger with Pirelli
was toppled. In an unscheduled meeting on May 9, 1991, Continental’s
supervisory board met and accepted Mr. Urban’s resignation. The board
signalled to Pirelli that cooperation  talks could Start again if Pirelli would hold
off on demanding to place two of its own representatives on Conti’s
board43. As Pirelli agreed, talks were resumed under the condition of stritt
confidence and that no preconditions be put by either sides.18
X. Pirelli’s Withdrawal
After the talks had ended, Continental announced that it would look for
other cooperation possibilities and strategic alliances. Pirelli had, because of
the losses incurred, to restructure its capital by a rights issue that raised
about $ 420 million and the sale of Pirelli’s diversified product division for
around § 800 million. Leopold0 Pirelli resigned as CEO, allegedly because the
banks had insisted on his resignation because of the huge losses of Pirelli
and the negative Publicity connected with and the final failure of its merger
attempt48.
The struggle between Pirelli and Conti was not over, yet. lt flared up again
at the regular shareholders’ meeting of Continental which convened on July
3rd, 1992. With respect to the almost 39 % of Continental stock controlled
by Pirelli49 the chairman of the meeting excluded Pirelli’s and its  allies’
shares from voting because Pirelli had not given due notice of its Stake of
more than 25 % to Conti pursuant to § 20 Stock Corporation Act
(Aktiengesetz). Because Pirelli and its group were excluded, another motion
to remove the 5 % voting limitation was defeated, and Continental’s
management was approved by conclusion of the rest of the shareholders
present. Pirelli immediately filed a suit against these conclusions which was
retorted by Continental AG: Continental demanded that Pirelli pay the
dividends (DM 8,9 million) which had been paid to it and its support group
on their Conti shares in 1990 back50.
All legal actions were finally settled end of March this year after Pirelli had
decided to sell its whole Stake in Conti to a -German investor group. The
following agreement was concluded and executed: Mediobanca retains a
Stake of 5 % in Continental. Pirelli exercises its Options it holds on its allies’
shares and sells these and its own shares up to an amount of 18,2 % to
Deutsche Bank AG. Deutsche Bank will retain 5 % on its own and place the
rest with other German institutional investors like banks and insurances
which are unidentified so far. 15 % of Pirelli’s Stake have been taken over
by a group of companies from the state of Lower Saxony, where Continental
is based. This group is headed by the (public) Norddeutsche Landesbank
(which took over 6 %) and includes electrical Utility PreussenElektra AG
(5 %), Haftpflichtverband der Deutschen Industrie (HDI personal liability19
trade association) and the insurance Company Versicherungsgruppe
Hannover each of which took over 2 %51.
The whole Stake of 2,934 million shares and Options of shares was sold by
Pirelli for DM 330 million 1s 208 million) which meant a premium for Pirelli of
21 % over Continental’s closing price on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange of
DM 207 ($ 129.29) on Friday, April 2nd, 1993. Nevertheless a purchase
prize of DM 250 per share still meant
prize of between DM 280 and DM 310
Pirelli had incurred52.
a huge loss considering a purchase
per share and the other costs which
Satisfaction was nevertheless expressed on both sides. Continental’s new
executive board chairman Hubertus von Grünberg said with the decision of
Pirelli to sell its Stake in Continental AG, Conti had “wen back full freedom
of action and will use it in the best interests of the group of its customers,
shareholders, and workers”. Pirelli said that the Pirelli-Continental Saga had
“a good ending”, because “it produces a cash inflow and a capital gain for
Pirelli”, a considerable profit for its allies and the conditions for the two tire
makers “to go their independent ways”.
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XI. Postscript: On the Role of the State in Take-over Battles
A postscript should be made with respect to the role of the state within the
whole game, especially the Prime Minister of the federal state of Lower
Saxony, the Social Demotrat Gerhard Schröder. After Schröder initially had
held talks with Leopold0 Pirelli on Pirelli’s merger Plans and declared his full
support, he again interfered during the final agreement talks between Conti
and Pirelli and explained after these talks that a “great
achieved53: The Stake of Pirelli and other Italian allies
back into the hands of German investors, a Solution
guarantee that a Japanese investor who also had
success”  had been
were thus brought
which would also
shown interest in
Continental in the meantime could be blocked  successfully, too54. This was
apparantly worth it for Mr. Schröder to take the finance risk for the
Operation on the state’s budget. In Order to finance the purchase prize for
the part of Pirelli’s Stake which was purchased by the Lower Saxon-group
(Norddeutsche Landesbank and others), Norddeutsche Landesbank issued
Convertible bonds to the other members of the group which give these
members the Option to convert these bonds into shares between 1995 and
2000. The conversion is possible only with consent of the state of Lower
Saxony. They bear annual interests of 6 per cent. The payments of the
interests as well as losses resulting for Norddeutsche Landesbank from
drops in share prizes are guaranteed by the state of Lower Saxony up to an
amount of DM 311 million plus an additional authorization to over
DM 161 ,14 million55. But what are these numbers compared to a total state
debt burden of Lower Saxony of about DM 50 billion? They tan easily be
financed by slashing further expenses for, e. g., universities like in the past
two years which only produce annoying studies like this one anyway.*
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Dr. jur., Professor of Law, Director, Institut für Handels- und
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Universite libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, May 27, 1993. I am grateful
to Markus König for his research assistance.
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